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The events of 19 December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself afire to protest 
the Tunisian dictatorial regime, have since provoked a stunning response across the Middle East 
and North Africa. The uprisings that have swept across the region have been swift and strong, 
and have shaken leaders to the core, as they decide how to respond to the overwhelming show of 
popular discontent. Some of the uprisings have achieved their desired results, such as the 
overthrows of Tunisian leader Ben-Ali, Egyptian president Mubarak, and eventually Libyan 
dictator Qaddafi. Others have been less successful, with protests still raging in Syria, Bahrain 
and Yemen. 1 
In the face of such violent and sudden upheavals in a region that seemed more or less 
firmly in the grip of repressive autocratic governments, the international community, including 
the United States, has scrambled to coordinate its foreign policy and establish the defensible 
positions vis-a-vis each tumultuous country. The United Nations Security Council has taken 
little action, except for its authorization of a humanitarian intervention in Libya;2 the leading 
voice of the otherwise silent UN has been its Human Rights Commissioner, Navi Pillay, who has 
been swift in condemning the violent reactions of the Arab Spring govemments.3 The United 
States, for a while, had remained aloof from the protests, and once it decided to engage, has had 
to make up for lost time. Its response, therefore, has been belated, cautious, and also selective. 4 
1 See Garry Blight, Sheila Pulliam and Paul Torpey, Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests, 
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 20 11), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/20 11/mar/22/middle-east-protest-
interactive-timeline. 
2 See e.g. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) and S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973 
(March 17, 2011). 
3 See e.g. Syria should be referred to ICC, UN's Navi Pillay says, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www .bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16151424; Libya protests: Thousands of foreigners flee violence, 
BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12535883; UN human rights chiefNavi Pillay 
condemns Cairo deaths, BBCNEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15854418; Bahrain 
unrest: UN rights chief criticizes crackdown, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 20 II), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-12769168. 
4 Ian Black, Barack Obama signals selective US response to 'Arab Spring', THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 1 Ilmay/19/barack-obama-response-arab-spring. 
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US policy towards the individual countries in the rebelling Middle East has primarily 
highlighted human rights and humanitarian concerns. 5 Yet in affirming unyielding support for 
"Arab human rights," President Obama, in a big policy speech in May, also said that "America 
could not 'prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime against its people. "'6 This unwieldy 
dichotomy of principles-the result of "long years of US support for the[ ... ] now deposed 
[Middle Eastern] dictators" 7-has been reconciled in the US' response to the Libyan war by 
participation in the United Nations intervention; the US' response to the Syrian violence through 
symbolic sanctions and strong condemnation; and the US' response to the Bahrani repression 
with tepid statements of admonition and potential withholding of an arms deal. 
Despite President Obama's declaration, there is, however, an unspoken and 
unacknowledged reason that is better able to provide the rationale for the difference in policy 
that permeates the US' responses towards the rebelling countries and that can, in fact, explain for 
their differences. That reason is oil. 8 This paper will explore how the presence of oil, or lack 
thereof, as well as the safety of the world oil market, is the one factor that can consistently 
account for the policies of the United States in its response towards the Arab Spring uprisings. 
Part I will examine general US policy towards the oil-producing countries of the Middle 
East. Part II discusses the first case study of Libya. Part III delves into the circumstances 
surrounding Syria. Part IV turns to Bahrain. Part V links all three countries' rebellions to the 
global oil market. Part VI re-states and re-affirms the thesis and concludes. 
5 Black, supra note 4. The United States, policies would reflect the "core principles', of"opposing the use of 




"If I could speculate, I would say that oil plays an important role in how the international conununity reacts to 




I. US Policy Toward the Oil-Producing Middle East 
As the world's largest consumer of oil, with 4.7 billion barrels coming from overseas out 
of7.1 billion barrels consumed yearly, the United States' foreign oil dependence is an incredibly 
significant variable to which it must pay great attention when it creates its foreign policy.9 As 
such, it is a hindrance because it restricts available options that the US can pursue in dealing with 
its supplier countries. The US pays out around $1 billion a day to foreign countries for their oil 
exports, totaling about 16% of total US import expenditures. 10 This has created a situation of"an 
unprecedented and unsustainable transfer of wealth to other countries" whose interests often 
diverge from those of the US. 11 Additionally, consumption of oil by the United States is 
expected to keep increasing; much of this increase will have to be supplemented by imports in 
the near future, as domestic production is likely to stagnate. 12 So foreign oil dependence by the 
United States, then, could rise up to 62% of total consumption by 2020. 13 
Such a state of affairs thus "holds [the US] hostage" to the caprices of the oil market as 
controlled by OPEC, as well as to the political and economic security of the supplier countries. 14 
This overdependence would not be such a major problem were it not for the fact that much of the 
energy imports flowing into the US are from countries in the Middle East (and North Africa) 
with unstable societies and totalitarian governments. 15 All the money with which the US floods 
9 !d.; Jonathan Powers, Oil Addiction: Fueling Our Enemies I, TRUMAN NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT (Feb. 17, 
20 1 0 ), available at http://www. truman pro j ect.org/posts/20 10/02/ oil-addiction-fueling -our-enemies. This data is 
from 2008.; Keith Crane et. al, Imported Oil and US. National Security 8, RAND CORPORATION (2009), available 
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG838.html. 
10 Powers, supra note 9. 
11 !d. (quoting Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn). 
12 Oil Diplomacy: Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency, hearing before the H. Common International 
Relations, lOth Cong. second session 5 (2002) (statement of the Honorable Spencer Abraham, Secretary, US 
Department of Energy). 
13 ld at 6. 
14 !d. at 1. 
15 !d. at 1; Thomas D. Kraemer, Addicted to Oil: Strategic Implications of American Oil Policy 5, STRATEGIC 
STUDIES INSTITUTE (May 2006). 
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the oil market "enriches hostile governments, funds terrorist organizations, and props up 
repressive regimes."16 Some of those countries have regimes in power that are "actively hostile 
to the United States," such as Iran, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), and Libya (under Qaddafi). 17 
Others are unsteady and autocratic, with "regimes beholden to Islamic fUndamentalists like Saudi 
Arabia."18 Just as the totalitarian governments in those oil states have been able to repress their 
people and keep themselves in power by sharing their oil wealth, they-and other major supplier 
states such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela-have learned that oil is an effective bargaining chip 
against importers like the US. 19 This has made them more willing and able to use their exports 
of oil and other energy resources "to pursue their strategic and political objectives."20 
The US must grudgingly employ maintenance of the unsavory ties it has with numerous 
countries in order to feed its overdependence and prevent those countries from using that 
dependence against the US. The gingerly tiptoeing that the US engages in due to the sensitive 
nature of its suppliers decreases its international leverage and empowers those types of 
repressive governments because the United States is hampered in its ability to pressure them to 
change.21 Such dependence-which is continuing to grow-is "increas[ing] the [ ... ] strategic 
vulnerability [of the US] and constrains [its] ability to pursue a broad range of foreign policy and 
national security objectives."22 Any type of political, diplomatic, or military action that the US 
16 Powers~ supra note 9 at 2. 
17 Oil Diplomacy hearing, supra note 12 at 3 (quoting Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos). 
18 ld 
19 Kraemer, supra note 15 at 5; John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil 
Dependency 3, Independent Task Force Report No. 58, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2006). 
20 Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3. 
21 Id at3. 
22 Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3. The Report identified five ways in which oil dependence is 
affecting US foreign policy: I. "the control over enom1ous oil revenues gives exporting countries the flexibility to 
adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests and values;" 2. "oil dependence causes political realignments that constrain 
the ability of the United States to form partnerships to achieve common objectives;" 3. "high prices and seemingly 
scarce supplies creates fear that the current system of open markets is unable to ensure secure supply ... result[ing] 
in oil and gas deals that include political arrangements in addition to commercial terms;" 4. "revenues from oil and 
gas exports can undermine local goven1ance;" 5. "a significant interruption in oil supply will have adverse political 
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might consider pursuing against these nations-for whatever reason-could jeopardize the 
security of the oil market by threatening the potential disruption of oil flow, whether as a result 
of a tactical decision on the part of the supplier country or as a consequence of international 
action.23 Thus "fearing another embargo, [we bend] to the Middle Eastern autocrats and permit 
their anti-democratic and anti-American practices to go unanswered."24 
Ensuring a "reliable and affordable supply of oil" has become an increasingly 
unavoidable and prominent feature of US foreign policy and has a direct bearing on its 
effectiveness. 25 This has resulted in careful diplomacy that has led to some strange alliances and 
unintended and unwanted but unavoidable associations with, and support for, leaders whose 
policies towards the United States are less than friendly, coloring other countries' views of the 
United States. Precisely because of this reason, there is a deep-seated mistrust of American 
motives in foreign policy.26 In pursuing the spread of Western liberal ideals around the world, 
there is a greater perceived sense of self-interest in the policies of the US than a sense of 
altruism. 27 Other countries whose large economies run substantially on imported oil-Western 
Europe, Japan, India, and China for example-face similar suspicions about their motives but on 
a much smaller scale. 28 This is because they do not bear the same foreign policy responsibilities 
as those assumed by the United States as the world's largest power.29 The true objectives of the 
United States-bringing freedom and democracy to those countries that do not have them-are 
economic consequences in the United States and in other importing countries." The Report also highlighted that 
there may be a direct relationship between US dependence on oil (particularly from the Persian Gulf) and the size of 
its defense budget. !d. at 26-29. 
23 !d. at 29; Kraemer, supra note 15 at 3. 
24 Oil Diplomacy hearing, supra note 12 at 3 (quoting Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos). 
25 Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3. 
26 Kraemer, supra note 15 at 4. 
27 !d. 
28 Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 5. 
29 !d. 
seen as being "contaminated" by the pervasive need to maintain oil supply.30 So much is this a 
concern that in 2003~ when the United States went to war in Iraq~ it had to change the original 
name of the operation from "Operation Iraqi Liberation" to "Operation Iraqi Freedom" because 
the acronym of the former was O.I.L.31 Additionally, there were some countries that did not 
believe that the US war on terror was a sincere effort to fight international terrorism; rather that 
"control[... of] Middle Eastern oil supplies" was the prevailing motive. 32 Such an unsavory 
suspicion accompanying US foreign policy actions is unfortunate because the US will continue 
to play a role in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf--which, in addition to containing 
more than half of the world's oil reserves, is important to the US also for "nonproliferation, 
combating terrorism and encouraging political stability, democracy, and public welfare."33 
Given the highly sensitive and strategic role that oil plays in US foreign policy, it is not 
surprising to see that it has played a strong role in tailoring the responses to the Arab Spring 
uprisings. Many of the rebellions are occurring in precisely those oil-supplying countries that 
the US has been loath to antagonize. In order to protect those countries' supplies of oil-and 
maintain the stability of the global oil market-the US has intervened in Libya but declined to do 
so in Syria and Bahrain. 
30 Kraemer) supra note 16 at 5. 
31 See e.g. Press Briefmg by Ari Fleischer) Office of the Press Secretary, Mar. 24, 2003) available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030324-4.html. 
32 Kraemer, supra note 15 at 4. One such country was Syria, whose president Bashar al-Asad declared that the 
United States "is interested only in gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the map of the region in keeping 
with its world view." Eyal Zisser, Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard, MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 31-
2 (Summer 2003). 
33 Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 30; Crane, supra note 9 at II. 
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II. The Libyan Spring 
The paradigm of blithely supporting totalitarian oil regimes was, to a large extent, 
abandoned when it came to Libya, at least from the time that President Reagan assumed office. 34 
Prior to that, the US had had no qualms about being heavily invested in the country-{)ver the 50 
year period between 192 7 and 1977, imports of oil from Libya to the United States increased 
tenfold, and exports to Libya tripled. 35 Beginning in 1973 with the withdrawal of the US 
ambassador to Libya and the placement of Libya on the terrorism list in 1979, the United States 
began to change its position and ostracize the country and its dictator Muammar Qaddafi. 36 
Qaddafi' s support for terrorism and pursuance of weapons of mass destruction, along with 
various attacks on American targets led to an intensification of Libya's isolation.37 
The US had enacted a whole spectrum of sanctions against the Libyan regime over the 
years, covering a wide range of economic, financial, and military areas. 38 Among them were 
bans on the importation of crude and refined oil from Libya, the exportation of oil production 
and refining equipment from the US, and travel to Libya on a US passport.39 These effectively 
halted any and all US oil investment in the country. After the bombing of the PanAm flight over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States was finally vindicated in its isolation of the country and 
the rest of the international community became convinced that Qaddafi was a threat. As a result, 
the United Nations passed comprehensive sanctions, which were in place for 7 years.40 The US 
34 Jason Pack, Libya is Too Big to Fail, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/20 11/03/18/libya_is_too_big_to_fail. 
35 !d. 
36 Clyde R. Mark, Cong. Research Serv., 1B93109, LIBYA 1, 4 (May 23, 2002). Such attacks on US targets included 
the US embassy burning in 1979 and the Berlin disco bombing in 1986. ld at 5. 
37 Pack, supra note 34. 
38 Mark, supra note 3 6 at 5. 
39 !d. 
4° From 1992 to 1997. Pack, supra note 34. Those resolutions were numbers 731 and 748 and required that the 
sanctions be in place until Libya turned over the Lockerbie bombing suspects. Mark, supra note 36 at 4. 
also added the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1996, which barred all contacts between the US and 
foreign companies that were invested in Libya's oil industry.41 
The US' and international outlook on Libya slowly began to change as Qaddafi turned 
over suspects of the bombing and made overtures for shutting down his nuclear weapons 
program.42 President George W. Bush made Libya a key foreign policy priority during his two 
terms in office, seeking to reintegrate it back into the international community.43 This would not 
only be beneficial to Qaddafi, but also to US oil companies, who had been banned from investing 
in the country during the time of sanctions. In February 2004, Bush took the unprecedented step 
of rescinding the travel ban that had long been in place, allowing US companies to begin 
individual negotiations on reentrance into the Libyan market.44 Two months later, Bush again 
eased the sanctions on Libya, thus letting companies begin to buy or invest in Libyan oil 
products.45 The final step was taken in September of2004, when Bush lifted the vast majority of 
the remaining sanctions, fully opening up the Libya to US investment and granting complete 
access to its markets.46 Companies began to rush in to "secure new [oil] contracts [and] revive 
old ones" to help to modernize the Libyan oil infrastructure in order to take advantage of the 
technological advances that had since taken place, particularly in deepwater drilling.47 At the 
time that the momentum from the surrounding Arab Spring uprisings reached Libya, it was 
producing 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day.48 
41 Mark, supra note 36 at 4. 
42 /d 
43 Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African 'Oil Rush' and US National Security, 27 THIRD WORLD 




47 ld; Neil Ford, US Firms back in Libya, THE MIDDLE EAST 36 (Feb. 2006). 
48 Libya oil output to return to pre-war levels next year, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/news/business-15712718. 
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A. The Responses to the Uprising 
The protests in Libya began slowly in January 2011, as demonstrations took place across 
the country showing solidarity for the events happening in Tunisia.49 They picked up in size and 
intensity in mid-February, when a human rights activist was arrested. 5° On February 18, Qaddafi 
forces occupied various Libyan towns, attempting to secure them, but they were met with rebel 
resistance, particularly in Benghazi. 51 The violence grew as "troops and mercenaries sh[ ot] 
unarmed demonstrators" in Benghazi; the death toll continued to rise each succeeding day. 52 
The protests spread to Tripoli, even as Qaddafi tried to rally his supporters and exhort various 
entities (like al-Qaeda and the Islamists) for fomenting the rebellion. 53 On 27 February, scarcely 
10 days after the uprisings began, the rebel opposition groups formed the anti -Qaddafi 
Transitional National Council, to begin their appeals to the international community. 54 Despite 
that--or because of that-the protests continued to grow, as did the violence of Qaddafi's 
response to them, until the country was engulfed in a civil war, pitting the Libyan rebels against 
the army and Qaddafi sympathizers. 
President Obama's first response to the escalation was to enact harsh sanctions against 
Qaddafi and others in his government to restrict his access to funds and other resources, as well 
49 Matthew Weaver, Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2011), 
http://www .guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/j an/16/muanunar-gaddafi -condemns-tunisia-uprising. 
50 Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2011 ), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/feb/16/libyan-protesters-clash-with-police. 
51 Violence in Bahrain and Libya -Friday 18 Februa1y, THE GUARDIAN NEWS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011 03:41), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlblog/20 11/feb/18/middle-east-protests-live-updates. Benghazi has special 
significance in Libyan history. During the time of the Kingdom of Libya, created in 1951, Benghazi was the 
cultural center, even as Tripoli was the capital. As such, there was a tremendous rivalry between the two cities. 
Thus, it was from Benghazi that Qaddafi launched his coup in 1969. Erzsebet N. Rozsa and Laszlo Tuske, Libya: 
The Other Way or Are the Tribes Ruling the Agenda? 5, 7, HUNGARIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Oct. 
12, 20 11); Profile: Muammar Gaddafi, BBC NEWS (June 27, 20 11), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
12488278. 
52 Ian Black, Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 20 11), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead. 
53 ld 
54 Christian Pippan, The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Militmy Intervention, and International Law 159, 
JURIDIKUM (2/2011). 
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as against the National Oil Corporation and its subsidiaries. 55 American oil companies, however, 
were outspokenly opposed to those types of unilateral sanctions, arguing that such a measure 
cannot succeed on its own and that the US should seek to work through the UN and implement a 
multilateral strategy. 56 Of course, such a statement is highly self-serving, given that such 
sanctions make it more difficult for oil companies to do business in Libya. The US was also 
adamant about pursuing multiple non-military avenues for ameliorating the situation in Libya. 
The US made available $4 7 million to international and regional humanitarian organizations to 
ensure that aid gets to those who need it. 57 The Obama administration also "ratchet[ ed] up 
pressure and further isolate[ ed] Colonel Qadhafi and his associates" by making it explicitly clear 
that he "ha[d] lost the legitimacy to lead, and must go."58 As a parallel strategy, the US also 
immediately began "supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people," by sending 
Secretary Clinton to meet with a representative from the Transitional National Council to discuss 
strategy. 59 
Nevertheless, imposing sanctions was the only unilateral action that Obama took60-after 
that, and even during that time, he ardently pursued an international approach through the United 
Nations.61 In the case of Libya, the United Nations-with the active participation of the United 
55 Libya: Oil Industry Group Opposes Obama 's Sanctions, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 4, 20 II), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/20 Il/03/libya-qaddafi-usa-engage-sanctions; Exec. Order 13566, Blocking Property 
and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya, Feb. 25, 20 1I, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/20 Il/02/25/executive-order-libya; Libya: ,Defining US National Security Interests, March 3I, 20 II, 
Testimony by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
http://www.state.gov/s/dlformer/steinberg/remarks/2011/I69301.htm. 
56 Libya: Oil Industry Group Opposes Obama's Sanctions, supra note 55. 
57 Steinberg testimony, supra note 55. 
58 /d. 
59 /d. 
60 The sanctions were tightened in June. OFAC Tightens Libya Sanctions, Press Release, US Department of 
Treasury (June 2I, 2011 ), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases?Pages/tg 1213 .aspx. 
61 
"Both President Obama and Secretary Clinton are avoiding unilateral decisions, continually emphasizing that the 
Libyan actions are under the UN auspices." Lisa M. Ruth, Does the U.S. policy on Libya signal a shift in foreign 
policy implementation?, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 29, 20II), 
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/life-lisa/20 II/mar/29/does-us-policy-libya-signal-shift-
States-became involved in the Libyan conflict very soon after the violence in Libya escalated to 
outright war. As early as 24 February, six days after the regime's crackdown in Benghazi, 
Security Council members were informally discussing the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
to take deterrent action against the regime.62 The following day, the Human Rights Council 
convened a special meeting to discuss the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Libya; it 
issued a resolution condemning the widespread human rights abuses and authorized the creation 
of a commission to conduct an inquiry into the situation. 63 
A day later, the Security Council passed Resolution 1970.64 The resolution called for an 
immediate cessation of hostilities and referred the situation-dating back to 15 February-to the 
International Criminal Court. 65 It also instituted an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze, 
to try to inhibit Qaddafi from accessing the resources necessary to continue fighting.66 Further 
action by the UN was urged upon it by the Libyan Transitional National Council, but the 
Security Council remained passive until the Arab League appealed to it to immediately 
implement a no-fly zone over Libya, leading to Resolution 1973 passed on 17 March.67 The 
foreign-policy-it:. It is interesting to note this change in foreign policy tactics. Over the past decade, the United 
States has never hesitated to use harsh words and sharp actions to signal its discontent with an international 
situation, often asking individual countries to join it, bypassing the United Nations framework. An example of this 
may be the coalition-of-the-willing in Iraq. It may be that the US has learned its lesson, that unilateral actions often 
have unacceptably high costs, fmancially and in human lives. ("The move from costly and ineffective bullying to 
balanced international participation is actually a savvy way to demonstrate US concerns without the enormous 
expense and human cost of a ground intervention." Ruth.) The 2003 war in Iraq may be one such example. 
62 Update Report: Libya, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 1 (Feb. 25, 20 11), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTisG/b.6586331/k.D62C/Update_Report_No_3brLibyabr25_ 
February _20 1l.htm. 
63 ld; Update Report: Libya, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 3 (Mar. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTisG/b.6621881/k.63C4/Update_Report_No_lbrLibyabr14_ 
March_201l.htm; Human Rights Council Res. S-15, Feb. 25, 2011, U.N. GAOR 15th special Sess., A/HRC/S-15/L.l 
(Feb. 23, 20 11). 
64 March Update Report, supra note 63 at 2. 
65 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2; see generally March Update Report, supra note 63. 
66 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2. 
67 Richard Leiby and Muhammad Mansour, Arab League asks U.N. for no-fly zone over Libya, , WASHINGTON POST 
(Mar. 12, 201 I), http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-asks-un-for-no-fly~zone-over-
libya/20 11/03/12/ ABoieOR_story.html; March Update Report, supra note 63 at 1; Christopher M. Blanchard, Cong. 
Research Service, RL33142, LIBYA: UNREST AND U.S. POLICY 3 (March 29, 2011). 
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resolution called for a cease-fire, no-fly zone, and invoked the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
in authorizing UN member states, whether acting nationally or within the sphere of a regional 
organization, to take "all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas 
under threat of attack. "68 
On 19 March, the United States (and other countries) "began military operations against 
Libyan targets."69 By the 28th, a coalition had formed of European, North American, and Middle 
Eastern countries contributing efforts to maintain the military operations, no-fly zone, and arms 
embargo.70 That coalition was then subsumed under NATO command and control under 
Operation Unified Protector.71 In these ways, by working through and with the UN (and NATO 
in the military aspect of the multilateral response to Libya), the US has been able to retain a 
fairly low profile while at the same time promoting its values internationally.72 
B. The Spectre of Libyan Oil 
Yet we would be remiss not to recall the close associations that the US has had with oil-
producing regimes. Such associations have led to a general wariness of US intentions in its 
foreign policy, coloring its actions. As much as nobody wishes to acknowledge that fact, 
protecting the investments of US companies in Libya is a consideration that must inevitably be 
taken into account. This concern is apparent in no less than a State Department cable released by 
WikiLeaks, which indicated that over the past few years, Qaddafi had gotten considerably 
68 S.C. Res.l973, supra note 2; Pippan, supra note 54 at 159-60. 
69 Blanchard, supra note 67 at 6. 
70 !d. 
71 !d. at 7. 
72 !d. 
~ 14 ~ 
tougher in his negotiations with oil companies.73 He had "threatened to dramatically reduce 
Libya's oil production and I or expel ... U.S. oil and gas companies."74 
This belligerent posturing was in addition to Qaddafi' s increasing emphasis on "Libyan 
resource nationalism."75 Qaddafi had begun verbally attacking the foreign oil companies, 
demanding that having made billions off of Libyan oil, they give back to the people. 76 Oil 
companies were forced to rename their local subsidiaries to "Libyanize" them; and oil companies 
were pressured to hire Libyan personnel, including managers, financial analysts, and human 
resources directors. 77 These very strict and nationalistic measures were in fact counter-
productive to the production of oil as they ''jeopardize[d] efficient exploitation of Libya's 
extensive oil and gas reserves."78 
As the conflict began to rage around him in February, Qaddafi closed the country's ports, 
thereby suspending oil exports. 79 With the suspension, foreign oil companies scaled back some 
of their operations. 80 Qaddafi then ratcheted up his rhetoric by threatening, a day later, that now 
that "the oil flow has been stopped, how are the people going to sustain a living? Will Bin Laden 
provide for them ?"81 He backed up his words by turning his forces loose on the oil fields, 
73 Steven Mufson, Conflict in Libya: US. oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold, WASHINGTON 
POST (June 10, 20 II), http://www .washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conflict-in-libya-us-oil-companies-sit-on-
sidelines-as-gaddafi-maintains-hold/20 11/06/03/ AGJq2QPH _ story.html 
74 ld (quoting Cable 08TRIPOLI2I4, "GOL Still Bristling Over Victims ofTerrorism Legislation," 12 March 2008 
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bombing various oil installations over the course of the war. 82 While the NATO airstrikes 
authorized by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1973 would help protect the civilians who 
were being killed by their own leader, they could also potentially help to depose the ruler who 
had made oil investment so onerous, thereby securing the oil flow. 83 Had the Qaddafi regime 
somehow survived despite the international community's response, it is not inconceivable that, 
given his previous rhetoric, he may have retaliated against the countries supporting the rebels by 
shutting down and closing off foreign investment in Libyan oil. 
Even with Qaddafi still at large, the Transitional National Council (TNC) began to take 
steps to normalize oil exports, in which it was helped by the United States. As early as June, the 
US had begun publicly encouraging countries to buy oil from the Council. 84 The US Treasury 
Department also enacted a new licensing policy to ease companies' restrictions from sanctions. 85 
The Council took a major step on 11 September, announcing that oil production would resume, 
mainly in eastern Libya. 86 With Qaddafi gone, the interim government of the Transitional 
National Council has announced that it will honor all the contracts signed under the former 
regime, and that in fact, it will shortly seek out new contracts. 87 The TNC has also signaled that 
while it will adjudge proposals based on the same objective criteria as before-technical 
82 See e.g. Gaddafi 's scorched earth: Libya's skies turn black as desperate dictator blows up oil pipes and turns his 
tanks on civilians, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 10, 20 11), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1364469/Gaddafi-blows-
Libyas-oil-pipes-tanks-turned-civilians.html; NATO Joint Force Command Naples, Qaddafi attacks Libyan oilfield, 
NATO (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/enlnatolive/news_72118.htm; David Smith, Gaddafiforces killl7 at 
oil refinery, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/13/gaddafi-forces-kill-17. 
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85 !d. 
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http://www .ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/e8adbc44-dcbd-11 e0-8654-00 144feabdc0 .html#axzzl fOvZ62me. The 
announcement was met with an attack on an oil refmery by pro-Qaddafi forces. Smith, supra note 82. 
87 Richard Anderson, Libya oil: The race to turn the taps back on, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011 ), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14806100. 
- 16-
expertise and quality of labor-those companies based in countries that actively helped the 
rebels "are likely to get preferential treatment. "88 
While the United States could not have been aware of this additional incentive to get 
involved in the humanitarian intervention, this subjective picking of new contracts is very likely 
to benefit US companies such as ExxonMobil and the consortium of Amerada Hess, 
ConocoPhillips and Marathon Oil. 89 This will in turn help to remedy stagnant oil production, 
which, due to Qaddafi's tough negotiation stance and resulting capped off at around 1.5 to 1.6 
million barrels per day, in contrast to the peak of 3 million in the early 1970s.90 The TNC's 
liberal and hands-off approach to the oil market in Libya will have the dual benefit of increasing 
the profits of those companies lucky enough to be awarded a contract, and help to increase oil 
production, thereby increasing revenues for rebuilding and helping drive global oil prices down. 
The fundamental bottom line is that oil from Libya is an extremely valuable asset, and in 
many ways, irreplaceable. Libyan oil is very strategically located as it is close to Europe; it is 
also comparably easily extracted and is of fine quality (so-called "sweet crude").91 There are 
special refineries built and equipped to exclusively refine sweet Libyan crude. The refineries 
would be hard-pressed to modify their equipment in order to process, for example, heavier Saudi 
crude.92 Libya also has the largest discovered reserves in Africa.93 The disruption of oil 
production in Libya-where one of the main basins surrounds Sirte, Qaddafi' s hometown, and 
88 /d. (quoting Teymur Huseynov). However, interim Oil Minister Ali Tarhouni has said that he does not expect 
any such decisions to take place until after elections are held to replace the transitional government. Margaret 
Coker, World News: Libyans see hurdles as oil output rises, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 11, 20 11), via Proquest. 
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90 Mufson, supra note 73. 
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where much of the later fighting was concentrated94-would not only (and has not only) impact 
exports to Europe, but would also have negative consequences for the recovering world 
economy.95 Indeed, repercussions have already been felt. The war severely damaged more than 
10% of Libya's oil production infrastructure and the "pipelines may be clogged with waxy crude 
oil after remaining stagnant for months."96 While it only provides about 2% of the global oil 
output, the reduction from 1.6 million barrels per day to little more than a trickle (about 50,000 
barrels a day) has had a noticeable effect on the world oil market, and it may be a while before 
Libyan oil production returns to full capacity.97 Nevertheless, oil production now having 
resumed in earnest, it has actually been recovering faster than expected.98 The refineries are 
already producing 600,000 barrels a day-up from the 50,000 they were producing during the 
conflict-and the International Energy Agency estimates that this number could increase to near 
half of its pre-war levels of 1.6 million by the end of the year.99 
Thus the forceful responses by the United States and the United Nations, while 
predominantly fueled by concerns of the grave humanitarian conditions in Libya, were also 
motivated by the need to secure the supply of oil from Libya in order to preserve calm global oil 
markets. 
94 The Sirte basin provides for approximately 80% of Libya's total oil production. Anderson, supra note 87. 
95 Pack, supra note 34. 
96 Pleven and Faucon, supra note 93. 
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its transition. Clifford Krauss, As Oil Production Rises, Libya Expects to Hit Prewar Levels by June, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Nov. IO, 20 II), http://www.nytimes.com/20 IIIIIIII/business/energy~environment/Iibya~sees~return~to~ 
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III. The Syrian Spring 
The relationship that the United States has had with Syria has often been contradictory 
and fluctuating. In 1979, the State Department placed Syria on its State Sponsors of Terrorism 
list, a move that triggered already-enacted sanctions against the regime. 100 The sanctions forbade 
foreign assistance to those countries determined to be aiding and abetting international terrorism, 
and they limited exports to those countries to less than $7 million. 101 These measures effectively 
terminated all US aid to Syria, which from 1950 to 1981 had totaled some $627.4 million, going 
mainly towards projects such as "water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and 
health and agricultural research."102 
But the strategic geographic location of Syria-"situated between the current flashpoint 
of Iraq and the perennial hotspots of Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Iran"103-has made it almost 
impossible for the United States to maintain its strict stance. As such, foreign policy towards 
Syria has swung between "engagement and dialogue" and "isolation and monologue.''104 
Relations with Hafez al-Asad, the late father of current Syrian ruler Bashar al-Asad, were fairly 
pragmatic as the United States sought to balance the influence of the Soviet Union in the 
region. 105 Once the Cold War paradigm became irrelevant, the US nevertheless continued to 
engage Syria as a "critical partner for maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East."106 
100 Jeremy M. Sharp, Cong. Research Service, RL33487, UNREST lN SYRIA AND U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE 
ASAD REGIME21-22 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
101 !d. 
102 !d. at 21. 
103 Mir H. Sadat and Daniel B. Jones, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Syria: Balancing ideology and National 
Interests, 16 MIDDLE EAST POLICY 2, 95 (Summer 2009). 
104 /d. at 96 (quoting William Rugh, former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, from Theodore Kattouf 
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2, 1 (Summer 2007)). 
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Therefore, the US ensured that Syria was part of the US-Arab coalition of forces that was 
assembled to oppose Saddam Hussein's invasion into Kuwait in 1991.107 
The change in Syrian leadership from father Hafez to son Bashar and the attacks of 
September 11, 200 1 completely altered the foreign policy landscape the US had been pursuing 
with Syria for some 20 years. Despite the valuable intelligence that Syria provided on al-Qaeda 
and unprecedented cooperation with the FBI, President George W. Bush heightened his harsh 
rhetoric against the regime and demanded that Syria pursue those same anti -terrorist policies 
against Hamas and Hezbollah, two groups it had been not-so-secretly harboring. 108 Additionally, 
the accusation by the United States that Syria was pursuing nuclear capabilities and chemical and 
biological weapons with the aid of Iran and North Korea, strained relations. 109 In response, 
Bashar broke with the non-confrontational policies of his father and grew bolder and more 
belligerent in challenging US involvement in the region. 110 The "severe fracture, ... almost to 
the point of a complete break" in US-Syrian relations occurred with Syrian support for Iraq's 
Saddam Hussein prior to his downfall and the safe passage Syria granted to al-Qaeda and 
Palestinian activists flooding into Iraq. 111 
In December 2003, and in accordance with the increasingly icy policies towards Syria, 
the US enacted the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. 112 The Act 
required that the President sanction Syria until "it ceases support for international terrorist 
groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction, 
101 Id 
108 Id at 95; Zisser Bad Habits Die Hard, supra note 32, at 31-2. 
109 Zisser Bad Habits Die Hard, supra note 32 at 31; Eyal Zisser, Syria's Diplomatic Comeback: What Next?, 14 
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-20-
... and has ceased supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq."113 Additional general and 
individual sanctions continued to be imposed on the country and some of its ruling members, 
particularly in the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 
in February 2005, in which Syria was heavily-though without much proof-implicated.114 
A. The Responses to the Uprisings 
The new administration under President Obama sought to pursue a "guarded but genuine 
diplomacy with Syria," as it recognized that Syria "links the Israeli, Lebanese and Iraqi issues 
together," and so "any breakthrough in any one of them" will take active US engagement. 115 The 
uprisings that began in March in the Syrian city of Dar' a have brought an abrupt end to that 
policy. A few weeks before the city erupted in protests, the police had arrested 15 schoolboys 
who had sprayed anti-government graffiti onto buildings, echoing the Egyptian and Tunisian 
slogans. 116 Large demonstrations protested their detention and the police opened fire, killing six 
protestors. 117 The funeral procession the next day became a political rally and the security forces 
responded once again with force and succeeded in sealing the city. 118 Tensions kept escalating, 
protests growing, and casualties mounting. 
Calls for reform were met with some partial concessions made by the regime. On April 
19, the Emergency Law-in place since 1963-was lifted and various promises were made to 
"loosen media restrictions, abolish state security courts, release political prisoners, and allow 
113 Sharp, supra note I 00 at 24. 
114 !d. at 26. 
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'approved' demonstrations."119 Yet the most consistent response to protests has been increased 
heavy-handed repression by the police and security I military forces. By June, Syrian forces had 
forcibly taken control of various rebellious cities, including Jisr al Shoghour, Hams, Hama and 
Deir El Zour. 120 The death toll, as currently estimated by the United Nations, is over 4000 and 
could be significantly over that number. 121 
The United States initially responded very similarly to the way it did with the protests in 
Libya, as the two countries have been treated similarly by the US in the past: by imposing 
sanctions. However, the response was more delayed and far more timid and hesitant. The first 
step that President Obama took was on 29 April, over a month after the frrst crackdown, and was 
to block the property and assets of three high-ranking Syrian officials and two entities. 122 But 
even before that, Secretary of State Clinton made clear that military intervention was not 
presently being contemplated as an option. 123 More sanctions were enacted in May, this time 
targeting President Asad along with six other close officials. 124 However, given that the United 
States has very few economic interests in Syria, the sanctions are much more of a symbolic 
nature, and ones geared more towards persuading other countries-who have more significant 
ties-to take action.125 Indeed, the swath of unilateral sanctions in place since 1979 have left 
119 !d. at 4, 6. 
120 !d. at 8-9. 
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"US adversaries and even allies . . . eager to fill the economic vacuum left by American 
companies," at the expense of US loss of trade and investment. 126 
As such, the US has also employed a heavy regimen of rhetoric, urging such countries to 
use their economic leverage and increase the pressure on the Syrian government in order to stop 
the violence.127 With the United States not pursuing as active a role in the Syrian uprising, the 
Arab League-as in Libya-has taken over the reins. In early November, it suspended Syria 
from the organization and several weeks later imposed a strong set of sanctions on the regime 
after it failed to allow international observers into the country, as previously agreed upon. 128 The 
various measures include an asset freeze, an investment embargo, a ban on commercial flights, 
and a halt on funding from Arab govenunents for Syria development projects. 129 The United 
Nations has tried to be as involved in the affairs of Syria as it has in Libya, but so far without 
success. In early October, the Security Council had attempted to pass a resolution condemning 
the Syrian repression of anti-govenunent protests, but the resolution failed to pass as China and 
Russia used their veto. 130 
B. The Spectre of Syrian Oil 
There are, arguably, even more forces at work in the international community's response 
to the Syrian uprising than in Libya. Any response, by whichever country, must take into 
"account the Israeli-Palestinian divide, the Sunni-Shia divide, the Muslim-Christian divide, 
widespread anti-Semitism, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the security of oil supplies pumped by weak 
126 Sadat and Jones, supra note 103 at 99. 
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regimes, al-Qaeda and related radicals, tribalism, corruption, and a picturesque lineup of 
despots."131 Oil has, however, been a largely ignored factor in the uprising, whether in the form 
of Syrian oil or the supply of oil flowing from other countries (especially Iraq) through Syria. 
But the uprisings have had an effect on oil in the country in many ways and fears of disturbing 
Iraqi (and potentially Iranian and Saudi) oil flow have dampened the international community's 
willingness to intervene. 
Revenue from Syrian oil exports comprises three-quarters of Syria's economy. 132 Syrian 
oil production has been falling over the years, dropping from 580,000 barrels per day in 2001 to 
387,000 barrels per day in January 2011. 133 Given that oil is such a large percentage of its 
economy, even though production is comparatively low, the oil sector has been an easy target for 
sanctions. Both the United States and the European Union have done so, to try to reduce the 
revenue filling the pockets of the Asad regime. 134 New sanctions by the Obama administration, 
enacted in August, specifically prohibit any US entity from conducting any transactions in Syrian 
petroleum products. 135 The EU sanctions have been particularly devastating for the regime, as 
the bulk of its exports flow to European countries; Syria has had to reduce production from 
380,000 barrels to approximately 250,000 and this number may continue to fall. 136 But while the 
export of oil from Syria has gotten more difficult, Syria is likely to continue exporting, even 
though it has to turn to "alternative" countries, such as "Russia, China or Malaysia. "137 
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Additionally, in order to be able to find just the right buyer, "Syria will [probably] have to offer a 
discount of up to 20 per cent to attract buyers."138 If Russia and China are going to be the 
primary beneficiaries of such a discount, it is highly unlikely they will consider taking any type 
of action that would jeopardize cheaper oil supply-even as their preliminary objections to 
intervention in the Security Council have been on grounds of territorial sovereignty and illegal 
expansion of the Libyan military mandate. 139 
The very small percentage that Syria contributes to the crude oil market has had only a 
negligible effect on global prices, even though the market is very tight. 140 Unlike Libyan oil 
production, which was reduced to almost nothing because of the raging conflict, Syria is still 
able to produce at over 50% of its capacity, even if the reduction is due to sanctions. Yet there 
are other, far more pressing, oil concerns in Syria, aside from domestic production. "Syria ... 
occup[ies] the most strategic position [geographically] in the transit" of regional oil; in fact, it is 
"indispensable."141 As such, it has served as the transit country for oil from Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia. 142 The 500,000 barrel a day Trans-Arabian pipeline that transported Saudi oil closed in 
1976 for financial reasons, but there have been proposals to rehabilitate it. 143 Syria also houses a 
second pipeline from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas which, constructed in 1952, is about 
500 miles long and is able to carry about 300,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day. 144 Closed originally 
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in 1982, in 2000, Syria and Iraq agreed to resume pumping oil through it. 145 Oil flow was shut 
off again in 2003 when it was damaged during the US invasion of Iraq, but in August 2007, the 
two countries agreed to repair and re-open it. 146 While it has yet to re-open, Iraq has new plans 
to build three pipelines through Syria, to allow for the export of heavy and light oil, and natural 
gas. 147 Towards that end, in August, Iran, Iraq and Syria agreed to build one such pipeline 
through Syria to access new European markets. 148 The deal, worth $10 billion, will carry Iranian 
gas and should take between three to five years to complete.149 
Countries intervening in Syria would be paying a high price, as any threats to physical 
security would effectively postpone these new projects potentially by years. In addition, any 
attempt at regime change could also make finalization of the pipeline agreements more uncertain. 
As a more important transit country than production country, the security of Syria and the 
pipelines that run through it, are undoubtedly of very large concern to the international 
community. The failure to repair the old pipelines and construct the new ones would prevent the 
reduction of transit costs and increase diversification of oil flow, which would be very beneficial 
in the event of a disruption of oil supply elsewhere.150 The precariousness and importance of 
such security was heightened in July when a portion of a function cross-border pipeline was 
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blown up in Mosul, Iraq.151 The damaged pipeline was shut off until it could be repaired. 152 
The Syrian rebels have already adopted this technique as a way to force the govenunent to listen 
to their demands. On 8 December, an "armed terrorist group"-what the Syrian government has 
termed the rebels-blew up a pipeline in Homs. 153 This was apparently the third time that oil 
installations have been attacked-one had been bombed in July in Deir al-Zour and another, also 
in July, again near Homs. 154 
The situation in Syria is less than clear and very complicated because Syria occupies a 
delicate-but important-position geostrategically in the Middle East. Internal disruptions of oil 
production and redirecting of exports to different markets has had some, but not too profound, 
effect on world oil markets. Even further disruption of the comparatively small scale of oil 
production will still not likely have as harsh an effect on global oil prices as Libya has. Thus the 
links between oil and international intervention in response to its Arab Spring uprising are more 
tenuous. However, Syria is also a very important! oil transit country, and as such has several 
new pipeline projects under completion. The need to maintain sufficient security to allow the 
construction of those three new pipelines-as well as the need to maintain political stability and 
a diplomatic environment friendly to such investment deals-is a consideration that may well 
influence those countries resisting international intervention. The two most opposed, Russia and 
China, in fact stand to benefit from the status quo of no intervention, given that they are 
receiving a discounted supply of Syrian oil. But the United States, too, has been coy about the 
prospects for intervention. The apprehension that disruption of the production and transit of oil 
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in Syria would have consequences-though the scale is unknown-not only for the prices of 
crude oil but also on the supplies of those countries that rely on Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and 
potentially even Saudi exports, could be a factor arresting US action; indeed, it may even be the 
uncertainty of the effect of the disruption urging caution. 
IV. The Bahraini Spring 
Unlike with Libya and Syria, the United States and Bahrain have had a very close 
relationship since 1948. That was the year that Bahrain agreed to the presence of a U.S. naval 
command, in exchange for a security guarantee, to protect it from its more powerful 
neighbors. 155 Since then, the military and diplomatic ties between the two countries have only 
increased. The US opened an embassy in the capital of Manama in 1971, and Bahrain now also 
houses the US Naval Fifth Fleet and hosts about 2300 military personnel from the United 
States.156 In 2002, President George W. Bush made Bahrain a "major non-NATO ally," a legal 
designation that allows the United States to sell the country weapons. 157 With such a close 
strategic partnership, Bahrain and the US have cooperated in combating terrorism and piracy in 
the Persian Gulf, checking the nuclear expansion of Iran, and addressing various threats from 
Iraq and Afghanistan. 158 Thus when the Arab Spring winds blew into the little Gulf monarchy, 
the United States paid very close attention. 
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A. The Responses to the Bahraini Spring 
Immediately following the success of the Egyptian people in toppling the regime of 
Hosni Mubarak, Bahraini Shiites took to the streets on 13 February to protest the Sunni-
dominated government. 159 The Bahraini king, in anticipation of the Arab Spring momentum, had 
tried to appease his citizens with a $2700 payment, but this failed to stop the protests.160 The 
government then turned the security forces out onto the protesters, who had gathered in Pearl 
Square by the thousands. 161 Several people were killed and many wounded as rubber bullets and 
tear gas were used. 162 The US began to feel unease and urged the Bahraini government to refrain 
from using force to dispel the protesters. 163 
Heeding the warnings of the United States, the king switched tactics by ordering the 
security forces to stand down and proposed the opening of a dialogue with Shiite leaders for 
reforms. 164 This tack looked promising, at least on the side of the government, as the king 
released and pardon 25 political prisoners and changed several of his cabinet posts. 165 However, 
with the dialogue not forthcoming, protests erupted again and grew to overwhelm the security 
forces. 166 As a result, Bahrain turned to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and requested that 
its members send it assistance in suppressing the rebellion. 167 On 14 March, 1200 troops from 
Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates crossed into Bahrain and were immediately 
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placed around Manama to help "protect key sites."168 This protection, however, effectively 
allowed the king to declare a state of emergency and, with the help of the GCC forces, forcibly 
remove protesters from Pearl Square.169 There were more protester deaths attributed to this 
crackdown, and many other opposition figures were arrested and detained. 170 
The violence of the repression has deeply disturbed the United States, which has 
nevertheless continued to merely "chide" Bahrain. 171 The US has not "called on [the Bahraini 
government or even the king to step down] as it had on beleaguered autocratic leaders in Egypt, 
Tunisia, Syria and Yemen.''172 On the contrary, after the king released the political prisoners, 
Secretary Clinton praised the move and encouraged the opposition groups to acquiesce to the 
king's proposal for a dialogue on reform. 173 The US has also continued to make statements 
supporting the king's lukewarm attempts to reform and even sent over an envoy to help with the 
process. 174 
The only action that the US has taken that is even somewhat commensurate with the strict 
sanctions that the US imposed on Libya and Syria is that it has delayed a $53 million arms deal 
with Bahrain pending the publication of a report into the alleged human rights abuses committed 
during the crackdown.175 The report was requested by Bahrain-and will be paid for by that 
country-as a response to the international criticism in the way it handed disbanding of its 
protests. 176 The report was originally due in October, but has since been pushed back to 23 
168 Ethan BrolUler and Michael Slaclanan, Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 
14, 20 11 ), http://www .nytimes.com/20 11/03/15/world/middleeast/15bahrain.html ?pagewanted=all. 
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November. Once published, Congress and the Obama administration have pledged to "review 
the report's findings on allegations of torture and repression against the Bahrain government."177 
The 500-page report, released on 23 November, found that the security forces deployed to 
subdue the rebellion "used excessive force," and that those arrested were subject to torture and 
deprived of their basic human rights. 178 The grave charges contained in the report will need to be 
taken very seriously by Congress in its deliberation over the arms deal, the status of which is as 
yet undetermined. Congress also has to take into account both the fact that agreeing to the deal 
would "highlight[ ... ] a double standard in US policy toward popular Arab uprisings," and be 
unjustifiable "if the stage seems to be set for another crackdown. "179 The multitude of sensitive 
US national security interests that are intertwined in Bahrain are making it extremely difficult for 
the US to pursue a policy more in line with those it has adopted towards Libya and Syria. 
B. The Spectre of Bahraini Oil 
The title of this section is somewhat of a misnomer. Bahrain is not a major oil producing 
country, as it has, for the most part, exhausted its crude oil reserves. 180 But Bahrain is very 
strategically located and it occupies a very delicate position in the Middle East. It is a very small 
island in the Persian Gulf surrounded on three sides by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. The impact 
that a strong US response to Bahrain's own internal discontent would have on oil and the oil 
market-ignoring all the other interests that the US has in the country-could have 
reverberations throughout the entire region. This effect is discussed in more detail in the section 
on the global oil market, infra. 
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V. The Global Oil Market 
Just as the security of individual countries' oil supplies is an important factor in the 
United States' and international community's responses to the Arab Spring uprisings, so too is 
the effect that disruption of those oil supplies will have on the global oil market. The slightest 
fluctuation in supply to the market is almost guaranteed to cause a sharp fluctuation in price-
"the price of oil ... tends to be more volatile than prices of manufactured goods ... due in great 
part to the inelasticity of demand for and supply of oil."181 Because countries have fairly few 
options when a major source of their oil fails to deliver, they have little choice but to pay the 
increased prices.182 Therefore, with Arab Spring uprisings raging primarily in oil-producing 
countries, the rebellions-and even war-has the potential to affect oil production. Indeed, the 
conflicts have already affected oil production and the global oil market has felt the squeeze. 
The United States, in particular has a big stake in the world oil market, because it must 
increasingly import oil from overseas to compensate for its lack of domestic production. But it 
does not have very much influence over it. This is especially because the Organization of 
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) produces 38% of the world's oil and has "the potential 
to exercise market power rather than just respond to market signals."183 In other words, it can act 
as a cartel. While it does not itself import much-or any-oil from Libya or Syria, "disruption 
of supplies ... anywhere in the world will be distributed across the world market."184 Thus 
losing the 2% of world oil that comes from Libya, even though it doesn't have a direct impact on 
US imports, has the overall effect of raising oil prices globally. 
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In the past, when various events185-including OPEC supply reductions-"reduced 
supply and pushed up prices, the U.S. economy suffered a fall in its terms of trade and U.S. 
consumers have suffered a loss in purchasing power."186 Thus limiting the decrease of oil 
production from the various conflicts, in order to limit the shocks to the oil market, is a very real 
concern for the US. For good reason, too, as the suspension of oil exports from Libya in late 
February had an imn1ediate impact on oil prices. When the fighting began, crude oil was being 
sold for $84 a barrel. 187 Prices quickly rose above $93 and spiked at over $110 in April. 188 
Much of this increase had to do with Qaddafi's attack on the town of Ras Lanuf, an extremely 
important oil port. 189 The highest price recorded over the course of the Arab Spring was $127 in 
April.r9o 
Equally important, however, in the determination of oil prices is "pure fear in the 
markets."191 Therefore, the anticipation of shocks to the oil market can have a large impact on 
prices. When Qaddafi announced that he was digging in for a "long, drawn-out war," prices rose 
in response, because the implication of such a long war was reduction of oil supply and 
particularly a long recovery period before supplies could be resumed. 192 Such considerations 
were likely in the minds of the diplomats as the United Nations Security Council authorized the 
185 Such events include the 1973 Arab oil embargo; 1980 Iran~Iraq War; and 1990 Persian Gulf War. 
186 Id at 23. 
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humanitarian mission into Libya. The sooner the conflict could be ended, the sooner oil 
production could resume and prices drop. In response to the tremendous price hikes, in late 
June, the United States and 27 other countries of the International Energy Agency coordinated to 
release 60 million barrels of oil from their strategic reserves, in order to lessen the pressure on 
prices.193 The announcement itself--not even the actual release-had the immediate impact of 
"accelerat[ing] the drop in prices ... taking them to levels not seen since Libyan oil exports were 
virtually halted by political turmoil four months ago." 60 million barrels, compared to the 
amount of oil produced every day, is "relatively trivial" but it sent a strong message to markets 
that the United States and other countries were not going to let the reduction in supply cause 
prices to spiral out of controL 194 It also helped calm the markets after OPEC failed to reach an 
agreement, in early June, that would have increased member states' production quotas easing the 
supply. 195 As the Libyan rebels began to push towards Tripoli in late August, there was 
widespread speculation that the war would soon be over.196 The hope that Qaddafi' s regime 
would be overthrown within a few days, which would lead to a resumption of oil exports and 
production soon thereafter, led to a drop of more than $3 in the price of crude oil, trading below 
$106.197 
As events progressed, the world oil market generally became "increasingly concerned 
about a cascade of events in the [Middle East] regime, ... which hit oil-rich Libya ... and is now 
engulfing Bahrain" and has also spread to Syria. 198 With Syria and Bahrain, the concern is less 
about the impact full-scale conflict and potential intervention may have, than about the ripple 
193 John M. Broder and Clifford Krauss~ Global Oil Reserves Tapped in Effort to Cut Cost at Pump~ N.Y. TIMES 
(June 23 ~ 20 II)~ http://www.nytimes.com/20 Il/06/24/business/24oil.html. 
194 Id 
195 !d. 
196 Oil prices should fall~ supra note I87. 
197 Libya: oil price drops, supra note 190. 
198 Bias Libya attacks spark surge~ supra note 192. 
-34-
effect it may have on neighboring countries and their oil. Thus the impact on the market and on 
prices has been more indirect, as output in those countries has not been suspended. Syria is 
already invested in the construction of several new pipelines that will transport Iraqi and Iranian 
oil to the Mediterranean. The potential loss or long-term disruption of a significant portion of 
the 2.7% of world oil output that Iraq produces and the 4.9% that Iran produces bode ill and 
would deeply impact oil prices. 199 This may be a consideration deterring international 
intervention. 
The situation in Bahrain is even more sensitive given that it borders Saudi Arabia, the 
OPEC country that produces 12.1% of the world's oil.200 Bahrain's request for assistance from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council in quelling its protests, which resulted in 1200 Saudi troops being 
landed in the Gulf island, has already involved the large oil-producing country in its Arab Spring 
affairs.201 Thus any new confrontation between protesters and Bahraini security forces, or in the 
extreme eventuality, between Bahraini security forces and an international intervention coalition, 
would be very likely to entangle Saudi Arabia as well. Given that Saudi Arabia has had to boost 
oil production in order to compensate for the Libyan shortages, it would highly counter-
productive, and potentially catastrophic, for the international community to threaten either 
Bahrain or Saudi Arabia in such a way as to force the country to scale back its production. This 
would roil the world oil market and prices would skyrocket. 202 
199 Geopolitical unrest and the impact world oil markets, CNN (Jan. 3 1, 20 11 ), 
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In addition, Bahrain is very strategically placed in the Persian Gulf. It is close to the 
Strait of Honnuz, through which 15.5 million barrels of oil pass every day.203 This makes up 
about 17% of all oil traded worldwide daily.204 Escalation of violence requiring a renewed Saudi 
presence or triggering an international intervention would severely jeopardize the security of 
these oil shipping lanes. The US naval presence quartered in Bahrain could potentially be asked 
to secure the lanes in order to maintain the flow of transit, but with a conflict raging in Bahrain, 
it is likely that the military installation there would be obliged to withdraw. If the security 
deteriorates enough, the oil will have to find an alternate route by which to reach its destination, 
increasing its transportation costs?05 Even the threat or fear of a disruption in the shipping 
conducted through the Persian Gulf could easily send prices flying again. Intervention is 
therefore a step that clearly the international community has to take very seriously, as it would 
have far-reaching repercussions, not merely on Bahrain itself, but on Saudi Arabia and the world 
oil market. 
The stability and security of the global oil market is of great importance to the United 
States as it is heavily reliant upon it but exercises little influence over it. The numerous Arab 
Spring uprisings, which have largely occurred in oil-producing countries, have put the US on 
notice that any action it takes should be done after an analysis of the repercussions it will have on 
oil prices. 






The Arab Spring uprisings that have gripped the Middle East since late December 20 10 
have been championed as the people rebelling against oppressive regimes to finally assert their 
right to freedom. But the United States' responses-which theoretically should be fully 
supportive-have been more tempered, as the Middle East is a very sensitive area embedded 
with US national security interests. Many of the rebelling countries are those with which the US 
has pursued unholy alliances-one, to protect against the spread of communism by the Soviet 
Union (as in Syria) and two, to protect its supply of oil. 
The presence of oil in these countries, as well as the roles that they play in stabilizing the 
world oil market, has complicated matters for the United States. Given that the US is 
increasingly reliant on foreign oil imports to fuel its oil consumption, balancing oil and 
humanitarian interests in its foreign policy towards the Arab Spring countries has been an 
important task. But in fact, oil has been the one factor underpinning the whole spectrum of 
responses. The US and the international community intervened in Libya for the same reason that 
it has not done so in Syria and Bahrain: namely, oil. In order tore-secure production in Libya, 
the US and the international community intervened early; to forestall disruptions in Syria and 
Bahrain, the US and its allies have so far declined to intervene. Only time will tell if these 
considerations get outweighed by others, such as humanitarian concerns. Thus, while US and 
international policy may seem divergent depending on the country, in fact it is all bound by the 
same considerations for oil supplies and the steadiness of the global oil market. 
